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I. INTRODUCTION

This has been one of the most important periods for bankruptcy law
developments since the authors began writing for the Survey. On the one hand,
the Fifth Circuit decided several important cases of particular importance to
Chapter 11: Village at Camp Bowie, Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, and MPF
Holdings, among others. These cases, whether one agrees or disagrees with the
results, stand for the proposition that bankruptcy is equitable and flexible and
that, within the confines of the law, the bankruptcy courts should have
sufficient equitable discretion to arrive at appropriate results. In other words,
the days of the Fifth Circuit attempting to tell the bankruptcy courts how to
decide cases by a talismanic approach appear to be coming to an end.
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit issued several opinions that threaten the
very structure of the Bankruptcy Code. In two opinions, the Fifth Circuit held
that parties may not consent to the entry of a final order in a non-core
proceeding. Although this issue is presently before the Supreme Court and will
likely be decided prior to the publication of this Survey (or shortly thereafter),
the inability to consent to final orders severely curtails the ability of the
bankruptcy court to function as a centralized forum for adjudicating all estate
disputes. Separately, the Fifth Circuit severely curtailed the power of section
1146(c) of the Code by holding that service of a proposed plan is insufficient to
strip a secured creditor of his lien, if the secured creditor has not actively
participated in the case (such as by filing a claim). Thus, even as the Fifth Circuit
continues its pro-equitable approach with respect to deciding the merits of a
case, it continues to threaten or to remove from bankruptcy courts the very tools
that enable the process to function properly.
Lower courts have not seen much activity due to the general slowdown in
bankruptcy filings. As a result, they published few bankruptcy opinions of
particular note. However, even if the slowdown continues into the foreseeable
future (which the authors do not believe will be the case), future Survey periods
are likely to see a large volume of lower court opinions as bankruptcy courts will
continue to struggle with interpreting and applying the changes to their
fundamental structure in the wake of Stern v. Marshall and its progeny.
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II. CHAPTER 11 PLANS
A. ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE INDIVIDUAL CASES—IN RE LIVELY 1
Practitioners know that the absolute priority rule, applicable on cramdown,
prohibits any junior class from receiving or retaining anything under a Chapter
11 plan unless a senior class accepts the plan or is satisfied in full. In the wake of
the 2005 amendments, the question is how the absolute priority rule applies in
an individual Chapter 11 case. 2 The Fifth Circuit addressed the question in In re
Lively. The first problem is that the Circuit Court had to address the issue at all—
this is another opinion resulting from sloppy drafting in the 2005 amendments
which took a (mostly) pristine and internally consistent Code and slapped a
hodgepodge of special interest “fixes” to perceived “problems,” which resulted in
more problems for the courts to work through.
The debtor’s Chapter 13 case was converted to Chapter 11 because a creditor
filed a claim large enough to disqualify the debtor from Chapter 13 relief. 3 The
debtor proposed a plan that retained ownership of various assets, and paid the
unsecured creditors a small dividend, but one that exceeded the liquidation value
of the debtor’s assets. 4 The unsecured class rejected the plan, and the issue was
whether the absolute priority rule applies in an individual Chapter 11 case. The
more precise issue was the scope of the exception to the absolute priority rule for
individuals as a result of the 2005 amendments.
Specifically, the amendment provides that
The holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class
will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or
interest any property; except that in a case in which the debtor is an
individual, the debtor may retain property included in the estate under
section 1115. 5
The ambiguity arises from the reference to section 1115: section 1115 brings
into the estate not only the property that existed as of the petition date and is
property of the estate under section 541(a) of the Code, but it also brings into
the estate that property acquired postpetition. Thus, does the exception apply to
all property of the estate, or only to that property of the estate acquired
postpetition?
The Circuit Court, through Judge Edith Jones, held that the exception
applies only to postpetition property, such that the debtor may be able to retain
property acquired postpetition but not property heldas of the petition date. 6 The
court appeared to agree that the amendment is ambiguous (though it did not
expressly so hold) and that its legislative history is “unenlightening.” 7 The

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

In re Lively, 717 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013).
See 11 U.S.C. § 101.
See In re Lively, 717 F.3d at 407.
See id.
Id. at 408 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)).
See id. at 409.
Id. at 408.
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Circuit Court nevertheless applied statutory interpretation guides and
concluded that limiting the amendment to postpetition property would be
unambiguous and correct while adopting the alternative would have the effect of
repealing by implication the absolute priority rule for individual debtors. 8 The
second point (repeal by implication) was correctly noted by the court and its
logic is correct—reading the amendment broadly would effectively repeal the
absolute priority rule for individuals.
But, perhaps this is precisely what Congress intended: there is no absolute
priority rule in Chapter 13, and the amendment, appearing in section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Code, applies to both corporate and individual debtors. 9
In other words, it would be odd indeed for Congress to insert an exception to
the absolute priority rule if Congress intended to repeal the absolute priority
rule. If the amendment applied solely to an individual case, then that would be
the effect and the Circuit’s logic would be correct (Congress would hardly be
providing an exception to something that it intended to write out of the Code).
But, because the amendment applies to both corporate and individual cases, it is
just as logical to conclude that Congress’ precise intention was to repeal the
absolute priority rule in toto in individual cases, while retaining it for corporate
debtors. The language may be less than perfect, but that is only because
Congress inserted the language into an existing global subsection of the statute,
instead of having a separate subsection of the statute applicable only to
individuals. What is more logical and what leads to a less absurd result: that
Congress intended to repeal the absolute priority rule in toto for Chapter 11
debtors, as is the case for Chapter 13, or that Congress intended to repeal the
absolute priority rule just in part, such that non-exempt postpetition property
could be retained but prepetition non-exempt property could not?
The result is that, without consent of unsecured creditors, the debtor must
liquidate property and pay them less than what they would receive in liquidation,
because the circuit concluded that the plan offered the unsecured creditors
more than a liquidation. This is absurd. True, one may say that this is the same
result in a corporate Chapter 11 case, and that there is therefore nothing absurd
about the result. And true, it may be unfair for a debtor to retain non-exempt
property when his creditors are not being paid in full. But the question is still
the value of that property, and if the creditors receive more as a result of the
debtor keeping the property, instead of liquidating it, then the result is indeed
absurd. Also, in an individual Chapter 11 case, where an unsecured creditor
objects to confirmation, the debtor is required to provide value equal to the
claim or to pay over his projected disposable income for five years or more
following confirmation. 10
The court could just as easily have ruled the other way without violating
statutory construction principles and without doing violence to the Code. The
amendment states that “the debtor may retain property included in the estate
under section 1115.” 11 The amendment does not state that “the debtor may
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 409.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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retain property included in the estate only under section 1115,” or “included in
the estate by section 1115.” Section 1115 provides that property of the estate, in
Chapter 11, “includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541 . . .
.” 12 Thus, even a simple reading of section 1115 demonstrates that it says two
things: property of the estate in Chapter 11 includes prepetition property and
postpetition property. Reading the word “included” as a verb i.e., that section
1115 must be doing the inclusion of property itself for the amendment to
apply—as the circuit did—does not change the result because section 1115
“includes” property of the estate with respect to prepetition property as well as
postpetition property.
More than anything, though, if the purpose of the amendment was to make
an individual Chapter 11 plan function more like a Chapter 13 plan—as the
court noted it was—then why would a Chapter 11 individual debtor not be
permitted to retain non-exempt property, provided that the best interests and
disposable income tests are satisfied, when his Chapter 13 cousin would be
permitted to retain such property? The Circuit Court may well be correct on a
technical reading of the statute. But the statute is part of a comprehensive
overall statutory scheme and must be read in that light and with the
fundamental policies underpinning the Code in mind. It is also odd for the
Fifth Circuit to rest on a technical application of the statute, when at the same
time it applies judicial gloss that perpetrates substantial violence on other clear
statutory provisions (such as 1146(c) discussed in this Survey and the ability to
consent to a judgment in non-core proceedings). It is even odder that, as a result
of this opinion, the debtor cannot reorganize unless the debtor surrenders nonexempt property, and if the debtor does so, unsecured creditors might actually
receive less than they would under the plan.
Yet the oddest thing about the Lively decision is the very logic employed by
the Circuit Court. According to the court, the amendments addressed the
inequitable result that an individual Chapter 11 debtor, prior to the
amendments, would have to account to his creditors only for property as of the
petition date, and could keep postpetition property to himself: “[b]efore the
BAPCPA [Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consume Protection Act]
amendments, however, an individual Chapter 11 debtor would only have to
satisfy the absolute priority rule with assets that were ‘property of the estate’ at
the date of filing for relief; the individual debtor’s personal post-petition
earnings were not subject to liability to satisfy his creditors.” 13 The amendments
“remedied this potential inequity in Chapter 11 by adding to the § 541
definition the individual debtor’s post-petition earnings and property
acquisitions.” 14 This is certainly correct, but what then is the ultimate result
under Lively? Congress intended that a debtor’s postpetition assets be available
to satisfy creditors, yet under Lively, those are precisely the assets that a debtor
can shield against the effects of the absolute priority rule. The circuit noted an
ambiguity, the circuit applied standard statutory interpretation guides, and the
circuit may even have struggled with the analysis to reach its conclusion. While
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1115(a).
13. Lively, 717 F.3d at 409.
14. Id.
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its answer may be technically correct, the result is absurd and inequitable to
debtors and to creditors. That should have been the beginning and the end of
inquiry.
The authors have devoted considerable discussion to this opinion because
they do not believe that this opinion is consistent with the Code or its policies,
and they hope that their views may help a future litigant convince the courts
that the result should be overturned.
B. ARTIFICIAL IMPAIRMENT—VILLAGE AT CAMP BOWIE 15
In order to confirm a plan on cramdown of a class of creditors, at least one
impaired class of non-insider creditors must accept the plan. 16 What happens
when the debtor has enough funds to pay unsecured creditors in full at
confirmation, as is seen in some real estate cases where there may be one large
secured creditor with a large deficiency (i.e., unsecured claim), along with
multiple minor unsecured creditors whose claims can be easily paid?
Classification issues aside, may the debtor artificially impair a class—in other
words, not pay the class in full right away even though the debtor could do so—
in order to obtain an impaired class for voting and cramdown purposes? As
discussed in the prior Survey, Judge D. Michael Lynn of the Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Texas held that the debtor could artificially impair a
class of creditors, in certain situations. 17 On direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.
The case involved real estate, rather typical of many of the recent Chapter 11
filings, where the debtor leased commercial property. 18 The debtor had one large
secured creditor, and numerous small trade creditors.19 The plan classified
thirty-eight trade creditors, proposed to pay them in full within three months of
confirmation, and the class voted for the plan. 20 The secured creditor objected,
arguing that the debtor had artificially impaired the trade creditors because: (i)
the slight delay in payment was not true impairment; and (ii) the debtor could
pay the trade creditors in full and delayed their payment only to engineer an
impaired class. 21 To its credit, the debtor admitted at the confirmation hearing
that it could pay the class in full, but that it intentionally impaired the class for
cramdown purposes.
The court noted that “[c]ircuits have divided over the question of whether §
1129(a)(10) draws a distinction between artificial and economically driven
impairment.” 22 The Circuit Court also noted that, while its prior precedent was
unclear on the issue, it had voiced concern over artificial impairment and had
remanded a case to the bankruptcy court to consider the issue in light of the
15. Western Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Village at
Camp Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2013).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).
17. In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 454 B.R. 702 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011).
18. In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 242.
19. Id. at 243.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 243.
22. Id. at 244.
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good faith requirement under section 1129(a) of the Code. 23 Nevertheless, the
Fifth Circuit rejected the Windsor precedent from the Eight Circuit that
prohibited artificial impairment:
We expressly reject Windsor . . . § 1129(a)(10) does not distinguish between
discretionary and economically driven impairment . . . § 1124 provides
that any alteration of a creditor’s rights, no matter how minor, constitutes
‘impairment.’ By shoehorning a motive inquiry and materiality
requirement into § 1129(a)(10), Windsor warps the text of the Code,
requiring a court to ‘deem’ a claim unimpaired for purposes of §
1129(a)(10) even though it plainly qualifies as impaired under § 1124.
Windsor’s motive inquiry is also inconsistent with § 1123(b)(1), which
provides that a plan proponent may impair or leave unimpaired any class
of claims, and does not contain any indication that impairment must be
driven by economic motives. 24
Addressing the lender’s argument that this was akin to the same kind of
gerrymandering prohibited by Greystone, the circuit rejected the argument that
Greystone prohibits all “voting manipulation.” 25 Rather, Greystone addressed an
ambiguity created by section 1122 of the Code, but it did not “stand for the
proposition that a court can ride roughshod over affirmative language in the
Bankruptcy Code to enforce some Platonic ideal of a fair voting process.” 26
The overall issue is good faith under the Code and the requirement that the
plan not be forbidden by law. 27
Good faith should be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding establishment of the plan, mindful of the purposes underlying
the Bankruptcy Code. Generally, where a plan is proposed with the
legitimate and honest purpose to reorganize and has a reasonable hope of
success, the good faith requirement of § 1129(a)(3) is satisfied. 28
As the court noted, the bankruptcy court found good faith and that finding was
not error: the debtor proposed a feasible plan that would allow it to repay its
debts, to preserve equity, and to stay current under its plan. 29 As is discussed in
greater detail in Judge Lynn’s opinion, the plan pays the lender in full, while the
lender purchased its claim for a discount and was contesting the plan in order to
gain control over the collateral and have the benefit of the equity in the
collateral. 30 In other words, and although unspoken by the courts, the debtor
was free to resort to reasonable tactics to contest the lender’s questionable
motives.
The Fifth Circuit cautioned, however, that its opinion was not a blank check

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 245.
Id. at 245–46 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 247.
Id.
See id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
See id. at 247–48.
See In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 454 B.R. at 709–10.
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to manipulate the Code or the progress:
We do not suggest that a debtor’s methods for achieving literal compliance
with § 1129(a)(10) enjoy a free pass from scrutiny under § 1129(a)(3). . . .
An inference of bad faith might be stronger where a debtor creates an
impaired accepting class out of whole cloth by incurring a debt with a
related party. . . . Ultimately, the § 1129(a)(3) inquiry is fact-specific, fully
empowering the bankruptcy courts to deal with chicanery. We will
continue to accord deference to their determinations. 31
This is perhaps the broader import of In re Village at Camp Bowie: bankruptcy
relief is equitable in nature and often fact specific, and, while the debtor was
permitted to artificially impair in this case, it is for the bankruptcy court to
weigh all of the facts and circumstances of a particular case and the bankruptcy
court’s decision will be entitled to deference. The circuit’s conclusion was
substantially the same in Texas Grant Prairie Hotel Realty, discussed below. And, it
is no coincidence that Judge Higginbotham authored both opinions.
C. CRAMDOWN INTEREST RATE SECURED CLAIMS—TEXAS GRAND PRAIRIE
HOTEL REALTY
For the first time in decades, and for the first time since the Supreme Court’s
Till 32 opinion, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the issue of the appropriate cramdown
rate of interest on a secured claim in a Chapter 11 plan, in Texas Grand Prairie
Hotel Realty, LLC. 33
The plan, covering four Hyatt Place hotels, provided for a 5% interest rate to
the secured lender. Because no agreement could be reached with the lender, the
plan proceeded on cramdown. Of note, the 5% rate was more than twice the
contract rate (the contract rate being a London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
based rate), 1.75% more than the Prime Rate, and almost twice the Treasury Bill
rate. The lender, using the market rate approach, advocated a rate of 8.8%. Both
the debtors and the lender argued that Till, while not controlling (as it was a
Chapter 13 case), provided persuasive guidance on the cramdown rate issue.
Thus, the case came down to what methodology should apply to calculate the
cramdown rate: must one methodology apply in Chapter 11 and, if so, must it
be the market rate of interest?
In Till, the Supreme Court adopted the “formula” approach and held that,
for Chapter 13 at least, the cramdown interest rate should start with a
benchmark, the Prime Rate, and then be adjusted upward based on risk, usually
within a 1–3% interest adjustment range. Any higher adjustment could raise
serious concerns regarding feasibility, and denial of confirmation based on
feasibility would probably be the result. However, in Till, the Supreme Court
stated in a footnote that, in Chapter 11, it may make sense to look at the rate

31. In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 248.
32. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
33. Wells Fargo N.A. v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. (In re Texas Grand Prairie
Hotel Realty, L.L.C.), 710 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013).
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that the market would charge, if there is an efficient market. 34 This led to
substantial dispute as to what was meant by the Court, if anything. One circuit,
for example, concluded that the market rate must apply if there is an efficient
market. 35 Prior to Till, the Fifth Circuit had not adopted any particular
methodology, although it had held that the appropriate rate should factor in a
risk component, and it affirmed rates based loosely on the contract rate or the
Treasury Bill rate. 36
The market rate approach advocated by the lender in Texas Grand Prarie
Realty, L.L.C. was as follows. The lender’s expert looked to the loan-to-values
ratio of the cramdown loan, noted that no single lender would be willing to
extend such a loan, and then broke the loan out into three tranches based on
differing loan-to-value and therefore risk. 37 Each tranche was priced separately
based on the risk, with the last tranche being the return expected of equity, or
22%. 38 The expert then blended the rates on the three tranches to arrive at his
8.8% rate. 39 Not surprisingly, this rate could not be sustained by the debtors or
by the lender’s collateral, and would have defeated the plan based on feasibility.
This methodology is familiar to debtor’s counsel, as one that always leads to the
highest rate and whose purpose is not to arrive at a reasonable rate, but a rate
that defeats any otherwise feasible plan. Lender’s counsel would probably
disagree, but it is hard to refute that this approach always leads to the highest
rate. While the lender based its methodology on the famous Till footnote, the
fact was that even the lender’s expert agreed that no efficient market existed for
the cramdown loan.
The debtors’ expert, on the other hand, applied Till by beginning with the
Prime Rate, 3.5%, and then adjusted upward by 1.75% to account for the
various factors identified in Till, including the circumstances of the bankruptcy
case, the quality of the collateral, management, operations, and others. 40 The
lender argued that this was a “holistic” approach that could not be reproduced
objectively by a different expert; in other words, that it was purely subjective and
a number picked from thin air. Yet, if that is true, then that is exactly what Till
provides for. Moreover, the other identified approaches, including the contract
rate and the Treasury Bill benchmark approach, would have led to a rate even
lower than 5%. Thus, although the lender complained that the 5% rate was too
low, it was more than contract and more than other identified cramdown rate
methodologies.
The Fifth Circuit first addressed the lender’s argument that, although the

34. Till, 541 U.S. at 503 n.20.
35. Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re American
Homepatient Inc.), 420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005).
36. Fin. Sec. Assurance Inc. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship (In re T-H New Orleans Ltd.
P’ship), 116 F.3d 790, 800 (5th Cir. 1997); Heartland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Briscoe Enters.
Ltd., II (In re Briscoe Enters. Ltd., II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1993).
37. See Brief of Appellant at 18, In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 324
(2013).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Brief of Appellees at 49, In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 324
(2013).
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bankruptcy court’s overall findings are questions of fact, the choice of which
cramdown rate methodology to apply was a question of law, and that the circuit
should adopt the market rate approach as the appropriate methodology. 41 The
circuit rejected this invitation, reiterating its prior precedent to the effect that it
would not “tie the hands of the lower courts as they make the factual
determination involved in establishing an appropriate interest rate.” 42 Thus, the
Circuit “declined to establish a particular formula for the cramdown interest
rate in Chapter 11 cases.” 43 These holdings drove the balance of the analysis:
because the overall issue was one of fact, and because no particular methodology
for determining the appropriate rate was required, the bankruptcy court did not
commit clear error in finding the debtors’ formula approach more appropriate
for the circumstances than the lender’s market approach. Thus, the Till
approach was an appropriate approach for the Chapter 11 cramdown rate:
A bankruptcy court should begin its cramdown rate analysis with the
national prime rate—the rate charged by banks to creditworthy commercial
borrowers—and then add a supplemental risk adjustment to account for
such factors as the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security,
and the duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan. Though the
plurality did not decide the proper scale for the risk adjustment, it
observed that other courts have generally approved adjustments of 1% to
3%. 44
The court also noted that the lender’s expert’s method was incompatible with
Till, because the expert did not begin with the Prime Rate, but rather with the
market rate. The circuit also quoted the bankruptcy court’s reasoning
(Bankruptcy Judge Russell F. Nelms of the Northern District of Texas):
I disagree with [the lender’s] approach because it establishes a benchmark
before adjustment that I just view to be completely inconsistent with Till.
Till set that benchmark at national prime, but according to [the lender],
you first determine what level any portion of a loan would be financeable,
and then you begin to work from there. The Court finds no support for
that type of analysis in Till. If anything this strikes the Court as more in the
nature of a forced loan approach that the majority in Till expressly
rejected. 45
Importantly, just as the Fifth Circuit refused to adopt the market rate
approach as the only permissible approach, the court did not adopt the Till
approach as the only permissible approach or even the optimal approach. 46
Rather, it was for the bankruptcy court to apply the appropriate methodology to
the facts, and applying the Till formula approach for this case—especially where
there was no efficient market—was not clear error. Therein lies the importance
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d at 330.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 330–31.
Id. at 331 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 335.
See id. at 337.
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of Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty: not necessarily the result, or an (arguably)
debtor friendly approach, or even the approval of the Till approach, but rather
the rejection of any specific approach as governing, thereby confirming and
enabling the equitable nature and functioning of the bankruptcy court (after
years, it seems, of the circuit trying to tell bankruptcy courts how they should
decide cases as a matter of law, as opposed to a matter of fact and of equity).
Together the Fifth Circuit’s rulings on Texas Grand Prairie Hotel and Camp
Bowie, have once again made Chapter 11 secured creditor cramdown a viable
option, which will serve to ensure that secured creditors have a downside to
confirmation, thus motivating them to work reasonably towards the consensual
resolution that Chapter 11 strives to achieve. These opinions, more than
anything, have again leveled the confirmation playing field in the Fifth Circuit.
D. CRAMDOWN INTEREST RATE UNSECURED CLAIMS—IN RE TEXAS STAR
REFRESHMENTS 47
Few recent opinions consider the appropriate rate of interest that must be
paid to an unsecured class being crammed down in Chapter 11. Judge Jones, of
the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, considered this issue
in In re Texas Star Refreshments L.L.C., all the more relevant because he did so in
light of the Fifth Circuit’s Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty opinion.
The debtor’s plan separately classified a large unsecured creditor, who rejected
the plan. The plan proposed an interest rate of 5% to the unsecured creditor,
and that rate provided for a prepetition judgment against the debtor pursuant to
separate law. The issue was whether the 5% rate to the unsecured creditor
complied with the “fair and equitable” requirement to cramdown an unsecured
class. In the process, the opinion attempts to address one of the arguments made
against the Prime-plus approach approved of by the Fifth Circuit in Texas Grand
Prairie Hotel Realty. One of the arguments against the result in Texas Grand Prairie
Hotel Realty is that it leads to an absurd result where a secured creditor is paid an
interest rate that is lower than what the market would have charged for a well
collateralized, fully secured, credit worthy loan. In In re Texas Star Refreshments
L.L.C., the unsecured class would receive a lower interest rate under the plan
than the secured class, even though the risk of nonpayment under the plan was
clearly higher. If the interest rate is meant to compensate for the risk of
nonpayment, then the unsecured creditor should arguably receive a higher rate,
according to the creditor’s argument. The court addressed this issue as follows:
At first blush it appears that an unsecured creditor should receive a higher
interest rate than a secured creditor, given the risk of non-payment. This
analysis fails, however, when the relative risks of liquidation and
confirmation are considered. A secured creditor’s risk may increase given a
debtor’s continued use of the creditor’s collateral. An unsecured creditor’s
prospects of repayment may indeed be enhanced if the debtor survives and
the only other real alternative is liquidation. Such is the case here. If the
TSR Plan fails, liquidation is likely with First Bank foreclosing its liens.
Unsecured creditors, and specifically CFG, will receive no dividend on

47.

In re Texas Star Refreshments L.L.C., 494 B.R. 684 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2013).
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account of their claims. The risk that CFG will not be repaid is far greater
upon liquidation. CFG did not bargain for a 5% rate, but there is clearly
no market for a $900,000+ unsecured loan to an insolvent company.
While there is arguably a risk component required for any present value
analysis, there is no clear standard for setting the proper rate. 48
Accordingly, the court applied the Till formula approach and the rationale of
Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty to the cramdown of an unsecured creditor,
resulting in the approval of the 5% rate to unsecured creditors. Of note, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas soon thereafter arrived at
the same conclusion, and applied the formula approach to an unsecured,
deficiency claim. 49
E. CRAMDOWN SALES AND INDUBITABLE EQUIVALENT—RADLAX GATEWAY
HOTEL LLC 50
Is a cramdown sale that seeks to take away the secured creditor’s credit bid
rights subject to the indubitable equivalent standard or to the cramdown sale
standard? The Supreme Court considered this issue in RadLAX Gateway Hotel
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank.
The debtor proposed a cramdown sale of the lender’s collateral, a hotel and
associated commercial realty, free and clear of the lender’s liens. 51 With the
same, the debtor sought the approval of auction and bid procedures that denied
the lender its credit bid rights under section 363(k) of the Code. 52 This directly
violated section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Code, which provides that a cramdown
sale of collateral must be subject to the creditor’s credit bid rights. For this
reason, the lower courts rejected the bid procedures and the plan. The debtor,
however, argued that section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Code applied, and that
cramdown was possible because the treatment offered was the indubitable
equivalent of the lender’s claim. 53
The Supreme Court soundly rejected this argument: “[W]e find the debtors’
reading of § 1129(b)(2)(A)—under which clause (iii) permits precisely what clause
(ii) proscribes—to be hyperliteral and contrary to common sense.” 54 Employing
established statutory construction, the Court held that the more specific
statutory provision—section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)—applied, as it was most on point. 55
After all, the plan proposed a sale of the collateral. Although the Court agreed
that section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides three distinct and disjunctive avenues for
cramdown, the Court simply found that the plan was a sale plan and therefore
the cramdown sale provision, and not the indubitable equivalent provision,
applies regardless of how the debtor characterizes the cramdown avenue it seeks

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 701–02.
See In re LMR, L.L.C., 496 B.R. 410 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013).
RadLAX Gateway Hotel LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012).
See id. at 2068–69.
See id. at 2069–70.
See id. at 2070.
Id.
Id. at 2070–73.
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to employ: “[d]ebtors seeking to sell their property free of liens under §
1129(b)(2)(A) must satisfy the requirements of clause (ii), not the requirements
of both clauses (ii) and (iii).” 56
This opinion is important, not only because it clarifies the issue, but also
because it effectively reverses the Fifth Circuit’s holding in In the Matter of Pacific
Lumber, 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009). In that opinion, the Circuit held that
section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) was not the exclusive cramdown avenue for a sale plan,
and that credit bid rights could be taken away even in a plan cramdown sale
under the indubitable equivalent avenue of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
Practitioners are cautioned not to rely on Pacific Lumber if they propose a
cramdown sale plan without protecting the lender’s credit bid rights.
Practitioners are also reminded that section 363(k) of the Code—which is
explicitly referenced in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)—is not absolute. The bankruptcy
court has the power under section 363(k) to deny credit bidding. 57 Depending
on the facts, it may be that addressing the actual right to credit bid, or asserting
that cause exists to deny the same, may be preferable and less risky on appeal
than using section 1129(b)(2)(A) to deny credit bidding outright.
III. CLAIM PRESERVATION (POSTCONFIRMATION STANDING)
A. COMPTON V. ANDERSON (IN RE MPF HOLDINGS US, LLC)
The authors have discussed multiple opinions addressing claim retention
under confirmed plans in prior Surveys. One that they had criticized, together
with multiple commentators, was Judge Bohm’s sua sponte opinion in In re MPF
Holdings, from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. 58 Judge
Bohm held that, in order to preserve a cause of action under a Chapter 11 plan
under United Operating, the plan must specifically name the defendants, set forth
the legal basis for the claim, and inform the defendants that they will be sued
(not that they might be sued). 59
As predicted, the Fifth Circuit reversed on direct appeal. 60 The circuit
reaffirmed that, under its United Operating standard, a plan must “specifically
and unequivocally” preserve a cause of action. 61 The Circuit noted that it had
clarified the standard in Texas Wyoming (issued after Judge Bohm’s opinion), and
that Texas Wyoming found that avoidance actions were sufficiently preserved
even though the plan did not necessarily identify the defendants to be sued
postconfirmation. 62 Thus, the court concluded that “the reasons relied upon by
the bankruptcy court for finding that the Reorganization Plan did not contain a
sufficiently unequivocal reservation are not supported by our case law.” 63
56.
57.
cause”).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 2072 (emphasis in original).
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (providing that the bankruptcy court may deny credit bidding “for
In re MPF Holding US, LLC, 443 B.R. 736 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
Id. at 744.
See Compton v. Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US, LLC), 701 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 454.
See id.
Id. at 457.
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The Fifth Circuit’s opinion is included in this Survey not because of any new
precedent that it establishes, but rather to note that In re MPF Holdings has been
reversed. Moreover, the opinion continues to recognize, as announced in Texas
Wyoming, that the “specific and unequivocal” standard is not the talismanic and
hyper-technical requirement that some have argued it is, or that it should be.
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
A. THRASHER V. MANDEL (IN RE MANDEL)
In In re Mandel, Chief Judge Brenda T. Rhoades of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas considered the issue of
whether a claim to a constructive trust under Texas law is a “claim” under the
Bankruptcy Code that is subject to the bar date. 64 In this case, the creditor
obtained allowed claims against the debtor for millions of dollars, including
claims for fraud and breach of duty. 65 The creditor timely filed a proof of claim
for the allowed claims, but did not assert a constructive trust claim prior to the
bar date. 66 Instead, after the bar date and in the middle of a lengthy claims
allowance trial, the creditor filed an adversary proceeding seeking to impose a
constructive trust against property of the estate alleged to have been the result of
the tortious actions. The creditor argued that the constructive trust claim was
not a “claim” and that it could only have been asserted by way of adversary
proceeding and not by proof of claim. 67
The court noted that constructive trust is a remedy under Texas law and not a
cause of action by itself. 68 The Bankruptcy Code defines “claim” as including a
right to an equitable remedy when monetary damages are also available. 69 The
constructive trust action, because no constructive trust had been imposed
prepetition, was therefore a “claim.” 70 The court also acknowledged that a
constructive trust conflicts with the Code’s priority provisions and fundamental
policies, and that a constructive trust should rarely be imposed postpetition. 71
This is an important opinion. It is difficult to argue with the court’s reasoning
or conclusion: constructive trust is clearly an equitable remedy for the same
causes of action to which monetary damages apply, and the Code clearly defines
“claim” as including precisely that remedy. That a constructive trust remedy
must be asserted by way of adversary proceeding does not remove it from the bar
date: it either must be preserved in a timely proof of claim, or the adversary
proceeding must be initiated prior to the bar date. The claim, even if not ripe, is
certainly contingent and unliquidated, and all practitioners know that the bar
date applies equally to unripe claims as to fully matured ones. This is neither
64. Thrasher v. Mandel (In re Mandel),—B.R.—, 2013 WL 4829150 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2013).
65. See id. at *1–2.
66. See id.
67. See id. at *4.
68. See id. at *3.
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
70. In re Mandel, 2013 WL 4829150 at *2 (the court had previously entered an opinion on the
issue, which was not published, but discussed the analysis in greater depth).
71. See id. at *4–5.
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unreasonable, unworkable, nor oppressive, and one would think that a debtor, a
trustee, and all creditors should know sooner rather than later whether estate
assets may be subject to constructive trust, for obvious reasons of planning and
reliance. But more than that, constructive trust actions are frequently asserted
and lead to substantial burden on litigants, debtors, and bankruptcy courts.
Usually, they fail (the authors are not aware of any successful postpetition
constructive trust action), but not before they consume substantial resources.
Frequently, they are asserted for leverage purposes. The court in In re Mandel
made it clear that the assertion of such claims, even if possible, will be held to
the same strict requirements as all creditors are held to.
V. DISCHARGE/DISCHARGEABILITY
A. BULLOCK V. BANKCHAMPAIGN, N.A.
Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt “for fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.” 72 In Bullock, 73 the
Supreme Court considered the meaning of “defalcation.”
The debtor was a non-professional trustee of a family trust created by his
father. 74 Over the years, the debtor borrowed money from the trust to purchase
property for himself and his mother. 75 Although the debtor always repaid the
funds he borrowed, with interest, his brothers sued him in state court and
obtained a judgment for breach of fiduciary duty, although the state court held
that the debtor appears to not have had a malicious intent in borrowing the
funds (and was instead guilty of self-dealing). 76 In bankruptcy, the replacement
trustee sought to deny the debtor’s discharge of his court-ordered debt for
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity. The issue before the Court was
whether defalcation applies in the absence of any specific ill intent or loss of the
trust principal.
The Court began by reviewing the use of “defalcation” in bankruptcies
commencing in 1867. 77 The Court noted that there was no clear definition, and
that appellate courts had long disagreed about the mental state that must be
present for defalcation. 78 Analyzing the term in proximity to the other terms
(fraud, embezzlement, larceny), the Court favored an interpretation that would
apply similar culpable mental states to defalcation, and the Court noted that
exceptions to discharge should be confined to those that are “plainly
expressed.” 79 Thus, the Court construed defalcation for purposes of the statute
as follows:
Where the conduct at issue does not involve bad faith, moral turpitude, or
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013).
See id. at 1757.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1758.
See id.
Id. at 1759–60.
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other immoral conduct, the term requires an intentional wrong. We
include as intentional not only conduct that the fiduciary knows is
improper but also reckless conduct of the kind that the criminal law often
treats as the equivalent. . . . Where actual knowledge of wrongdoing is
lacking, we consider conduct as equivalent if the fiduciary consciously
disregards (or is willfully blind to) a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
his conduct will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty. . . . That risk must be
of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of
the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation. 80
The Court remanded the matter for further proceedings, reversing the lower
courts’ “objective recklessness” standard, with instructions to apply the
heightened standard. 81
VI. EQUITABLE MOOTNESS
A. WELLS FARGO N.A. V. TEXAS GRAND PRAIRIE HOTEL REALTY L.L.C. (IN RE
TEXAS GRAND PRAIRIE HOTEL REALTY, L.L.C.)
The authors have discussed at length in prior surveys that the Fifth Circuit
has been clamping down on the doctrine of equitable mootness and has made it
much harder to obtain dismissal of an appeal based on that doctrine. The Fifth
Circuit visited the issue again in In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, rejecting
the application of the doctrine to the facts of the case. 82 The question remaining
is: if application of the doctrine was inappropriate in this case, then in which
case would it still be appropriate?
The overall issue before the circuit was the cramdown interest rate (as
otherwise discussed in this Survey). 83 The debtors argued that the appeal should
be dismissed as equitably moot because, granting the lender the much higher
interest rate the lender sought would make the plan unfeasible and impossible
and would unwind the plan despite many postconfirmation transactions and
payments.84 The debtors had made more than $8 million in postconfirmation
payments to dozens of creditors, including cashing out entire classes under the
plan. 85 Additionally, the debtors sold the equity in their company under the
plan in exchange for millions of dollars in funding from the new owner
(affiliated with the old owner). 86 The debtors argued that it would be impossible
to unwind these transactions, recapture payments made to creditors, and
compensate the purchaser of new equity for its payments. 87
The lender, very wisely, did not argue for the undoing of the plan in toto.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1761.
See generally In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013).
See id. at 326.
See id. at 328.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Instead, the lender argued that the circuit could reverse and remand in order to
increase the cramdown interest rate to the maximum amount that could be
borne by the debtors without necessarily unwinding the plan. 88 The debtors
responded that their plan was a zero sum game: all future cash flow was devoted
to one or another creditor under the plan. 89 Thus, being required to pay the
lender greater interest would necessarily mean less funds to pay the other
creditors what they were promised under the plan. 90 The circuit rejected this
argument, noting that, while the plan projections allocated every dollar to
various creditors, actual results might be better.91 Moreover, during the last two
plan years, the debtors projected net operating income of over $3 million that
was not allocated to creditors, and which could be used to compensate the
lender in the event a higher interest rate was required but which could not be
sustained on a current basis. 92 Thus, “the possibility exists that the Debtors
could afford a fractional payout without reducing distributions to third-party
claimants.” 93
One wonders whether the result may have been different had the circuit not
otherwise affirmed the bankruptcy court and the 5% rate of interest.
Nevertheless, the opinion is significant for two reasons. First, the Fifth Circuit
appears willing to try to find any way possible to avoid dismissing an appeal for
equitable mootness (as perhaps it should, since dismissing an otherwise
meritorious appeal is a harsh remedy). Second, the lender approached the issue
appropriately by not contesting (for equitable mootness purposes at least) the
confirmation of the plan as a whole, but rather solely the interest rate, and by
arguing that even if equitable mootness might prevent the much higher interest
rate the lender wanted, there was very likely some higher amount of interest that
the debtors could pay under their plan. 94 This was the epitome of the saying that
“pigs get fat and hogs get slaughtered,” and it worked for the lender. But it
cannot be disputed that the net result is the trend to severely curtail the
application of the equitable mootness doctrine. It will be interesting to see if the
equitable mootness doctrine has any remaining relevance to Chapter 11 plan
confirmations in the future.
VII. INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY
A. CREDIT UNION LIQUIDITY SERVICES, LLC V. GREEN HILLS DEV. CO. (IN THE
MATTER OF GREEN HILLS DEV. CO. LLC)
The Fifth Circuit considered the meaning of a bona fide dispute as to liability
or amount for involuntary standing purposes, in the wake of the 2005 BAPCPA
changes. 95 In particular, the bankruptcy court (although it denied the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 328–29.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 329.
See id.
See Credit Union Liquidity Serv., LLC v. Green Hills Dev. Co., 741 F.3d 651 (5th Cir.
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involuntary petition) applied a different standard to the bona fide dispute
inquiry under section 303(b) of the Code than it did under section 303(h) of the
Code. 96
Prior to BAPCPA, section 303(b) did not include the language: “as to liability
or amount.” 97 Rather, the statute referenced only a bona fide dispute, which the
circuit had previously limited to liability (as opposed to amount). 98 Previously,
therefore, a “dispute as to the amount of the claim, even if as to the total
amount of the claim (for example, through an offsetting counterclaim), was not
considered a basis to deny standing.” 99 However, by adding the phrase “as to
liability or amount,” Congress clearly changed this precedent and, in the wake of
BAPCPA, a bona fide dispute as to the amount of the debt, including as to
liability, defeats the petitioning creditor’s standing. 100
This opinion confirms that the language of the statute, as changed by
Congress, means what it says, undoubtedly making it harder to prove the
elements necessary for an involuntary bankruptcy.
VIII. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
A. AXIS SURPLUS INS. CO. V. FLUGENCE (IN THE MATTER OF FLUGENCE)
Practitioners are familiar with the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Reed v.
City of Arlington, which held that, although a debtor was judicially estopped from
pursuing a prepetition cause of action for his failure to disclose the same on his
schedules, the debtor’s trustee should not be judicially estopped to pursue the
cause of action for the benefit of the estate. 101 In Flugence, the Circuit considered
the question of whether, in such a case, the trustee was limited in the amount
that he could seek to the amount of unpaid claims in the bankruptcy case. 102
As is too often the case, the debtor received a discharge without informing
the bankruptcy court of the existence of an affirmative cause of action 103
(although here it was a Chapter 13 debtor and the cause of action only arose
postpetition, which is unlike most judicial estoppel cases where the cause of
action exists as of the petition date and must clearly be disclosed on the
schedules). 104 The defendant, recognizing that the trustee would not be estopped
from pursuing the claim, argued that any recovery should be limited to the debts
remaining outstanding. 105
The circuit noted that the debtor had a continuing duty to disclose assets,
2014).
96. See id. at 654.
97. See id. at 656.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 656–57.
100. See id. at 657.
101. See Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 573–76 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
102. See generally Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Flugence (In the Matter of Flugence), 738 F.3d 126
(5th Cir. 2013).
103. See id. at 128.
104. See id. at 129.
105. See generally id.
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including those that arose postpetition. 106 While the claim arose not only
postpetition but also postconfirmation, the confirmation order specified that
property of the estate would vest in the debtor only upon discharge, which
would be years later given the nature of Chapter 13. 107 Thus, the debtor had a
duty to disclose the asset and, by her failure to do so, she implicitly represented
that the asset did not exist.108 The circuit agreed that the debtor was judicially
estopped to pursue the claim. 109 With respect to whether the trustee was limited
in pursuing the claim just for the amount of unpaid claims, however, the circuit
concluded that there was no such limitation. 110 Although the opinion is not
clear with respect to what this means, the defendant had argued that “it would
be inconsistent with the goals of bankruptcy to allow the trustee to pursue a
claim where, as here, it would disproportionately benefit the attorneys over the
creditors.” 111 The court rejected this argument, noting that not being able to pay
an attorney would thwart the goal of the Code to maximize assets. 112 Moreover,
the Code provided for a mechanism to ensure that attorneys were only fairly
compensated. 113
Ultimately, the holding is clear: “where a debtor is judicially estopped from
pursuing a claim he failed to disclose to the bankruptcy court, the trustee . . .
may pursue the claim without any limitation not otherwise imposed by law.” 114
What is unclear is whether any of the benefit of the claim or its proceeds may
flow to the judicially estopped debtor (i.e., trustee obtains sufficient proceeds to
pay all claims, leaving an amount that would otherwise be distributed to the
debtor). Given that the Fifth Circuit was clearly troubled (as it always has been)
with a debtor benefiting from its failure to disclose, and that the discussion
involved administrative claims and not any benefit to the debtor, it may well be
that a trustee would be capped at a recovery amount that ensured no benefit to
the debtor, although this is not the literal language of the holding. On the other
hand, judicial estoppel is applied against the plaintiff and not against the claim. 115
While the debtor may not be a plaintiff, if someone else can be the plaintiff, the
underlying claim is still the same as it otherwise is under nonbankruptcy law. If
that claim entitles the plaintiff to an award of X, then that should be the award
regardless of whether the plaintiff is the debtor or the trustee, unless the Code
alters the elements applicable to nonbankruptcy causes of action—which it does
not. Moreover, with a trustee as the plaintiff, the trustee would have a sound
business reason to compromise a claim at an amount that does not provide
recovery to the debtor, thereby providing any potential “punishment” to the
debtor as a result of the failure to disclose.

106.
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IX. JURISDICTION
A. IN THE MATTER OF FRAZIN
The courts continue to struggle with Stern v. Marshall, as has been noted in
prior Surveys. 116 In this Survey period, the primary struggle was whether parties
could consent to the bankruptcy court’s entry of a final judgment in a non-core
proceeding. By the time that this Survey is published (or shortly thereafter), the
Supreme Court will have considered this issue in In re Bellingham Insurance
Agency, Inc. 117 Practitioners will almost certainly be aware of the results of the
Supreme Court’s review and, if they are not, they should immediate familiarize
themselves with the opinion. The authors can only hope that the Supreme
Court will not write section 157(c)(2) out of the Judiciary Code as the
implications for bankruptcy practice are grave indeed (unless Congress is finally
prepared to make bankruptcy courts Article III courts, which would save the
judiciary and litigants massive uncertainty and massive attorney’s fees, but is,
alas, a likely pipe dream).
In the meantime, practitioners must contend with a potentially devastating
opinion from the Fifth Circuit although, unless the Supreme Court avoids the
issue, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion will be replaced with the results in In re
Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.
In In the Matter of Frazin, the Fifth Circuit considered a now-standard Stern v.
Marshall issue as it affects state law counterclaims against court-approved
counsel. 118 The Chapter 13 debtor retained counsel under the Code, and that
counsel helped recover millions of dollars in recovery for the estate. 119 Counsel
filed applications with the bankruptcy court for the approval of its fees, but the
debtor objected. 120 However, the debtor not only objected, but also asserted
state law counterclaims against the attorneys for negligence, breach of duty, and
the Texas DTPA. 121 The bankruptcy court overruled the objection and allowed
the fees as requested, denying the counterclaims in the process. 122
Applying Stern v. Marshall, the Circuit Court concluded that the bankruptcy
court had the authority to enter final judgment on the negligence and breach of
duty claims, but not on the Texas DTPA claim.123 This is because “resolution of
the fee application proceedings necessarily resolved the malpractice
counterclaim,” as well as the breach of duty counterclaim, as both such
counterclaims had to be resolved in order for the bankruptcy court to adjudicate
116. See, e.g., Joseph J. Wielebinski & Davor Rukavina, Bankruptcy, 65 SMU L. REV. 279
(2012).
117. Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.),
702 F.3d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (No. 12‐1200). This opinion is
important not only for the issue of consent, but also because it holds that bankruptcy courts do not
have Constitutional authority to adjudicate fraudulent transfer claims.
118. Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, LLP (In the Matter of Frazin), 732 F.3d 313, 316 (5th Cir.
2013).
119. See id. at 316–17.
120. See id. at 317.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 321–23.
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the attorneys’ entitlement to fees. 124 With respect to the Texas DTPA claim,
however, the Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional
authority to enter judgment, as the resolution of that claim was not necessary to
the fee applications. However, the Circuit also concluded, rather strangely, that
“all factual determinations made in the course of analyzing Frazin’s DTPA claim
were within the court’s constitutional authority because they were necessarily
resolved in the process of adjudicating the fee applications.” 125 Presumably this
would mean that, if the debtor pursues the Texas DTPA claim, the same
findings of fact would apply, although this is left unresolved.
But none of the above is the true importance of In the Matter of Frazin, for the
above is a straightforward application of Stern v. Marshall. Rather, what is the
most important aspect of this opinion is the Circuit’s discussion of consent to
the entry of final judgment in a non-core proceeding. 126 Here, the debtor
brought his counterclaims in the bankruptcy court voluntarily, and appeared to
have at least implicitly consented to final judgment over non-core matters.127
The attorneys argued that, as a result, the bankruptcy court had full authority to
render final judgment on all causes of action. 128 The Circuit rejected this
argument in a footnote as follows:
However, when separation of powers is implicated in a given case, the
parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty. When these
Article III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be
dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the
parties cannot be expected to protect. As discussed above, Stern makes clear
that the practice of bankruptcy courts entering final judgments in certain
state-law counterclaims compromises the integrity of the system of
separated powers and the role of the Judiciary in that system. Thus,
structural concerns cannot be ameliorated by Frazin’s consent or waiver. 129
In other words, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) is unconstitutional, although the court
did not state so. No other conclusion is possible, however, if consent to final
judgment does not grant authority in non-core proceedings. That the circuit
would so state, in a footnote, with no real analysis, and seemingly ipse dixit, is
troubling, to say the least.
B. IN RE BP RE, L.P.
In In the Matter of BP RE, L.P., the Fifth Circuit held the same as it did in In
the Matter of Frazin, to the effect that consent does not confer authority to enter
final judgment in non-core matters. 130 At least in In the Matter of BP RE, L.P., the
Circuit so held after an analysis and citation, and not in a footnote. But the
124. See id.
125. Id. at 324.
126. See id. at 320 n.3.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
130. BP RE L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge LLC (In re BP RE, L.P.), 735 F.3d 279, 286–87
(5th Cir. 2013).
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result is surprising and shows the games that will be played without a clear
directive from the Supreme Court on the lingering fallout from Stern v. Marshall.
Here the result is that a litigant, having commenced an action in bankruptcy
court and having explicitly consented to final judgment—particularly as the
debtor—was able to escape and reverse course when things did not go its way. 131
The debtor filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court asserting
various state law claims against the defendants. 132 The bankruptcy court entered
a final judgment against debtor-plaintiff, and the debtor-plaintiff appealed. 133 Of
importance, the debtor-plaintiff filed a document with the bankruptcy court
explicitly stating that the proceeding was non-core and explicitly consenting to
the bankruptcy court’s entry of final judgment. 134 After the bankruptcy court
denied the plaintiff’s request for a jury, the plaintiff sought to withdraw the
reference and argued that it had not consented to final judgment by the
bankruptcy court. 135 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the bankruptcy court
lacked authority to enter final judgment in light of Stern v. Marshall—even though
the plaintiff was the debtor, even though the plaintiff filed suit in the
bankruptcy court, and even though the plaintiff explicitly consented to final
judgment. 136
The Fifth Circuit first looked at whether the proceeding was statutorily core
and whether the bankruptcy court had the statutory authority to enter final
judgment, both of which questions the circuit answered in the affirmative.137
Although the Circuit was certainly concerned with the plaintiff’s
“gamesmanship,” the circuit nevertheless held that the Constitution required
analysis of the bankruptcy court’s power, in effect testing the constitutionality of
section 157(c)(2) of the Judiciary Code. 138 The court adopted the reasoning of
the Sixth Circuit from its Waldman case, and concluded that consent to final
judgment in a non-core proceeding was insufficient. 139 As held by the Fifth
Circuit:
Where a structural interest is triggered, the parties cannot by consent cure
the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the parties by consent
cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the
limitations imposed by Article III, § 2. When these Article III limitations
are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because
the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be
expected to protect.140
The Circuit Court proceeded to construe and apply Stern v. Marshall broadly,
even though it noted that the opinion was intended to address a narrow
131.
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See id. at 285.
See id. at 281.
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See id. at 282.
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See id. at 285.
See id.
See id. at 286–87 (citing Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 930 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Id. at 288 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
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question. 141 Accordingly, the Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court
lacked constitutional authority over the action notwithstanding the consent of
the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2). 142 The court reiterated what it stated in
Frazin: “separation of powers is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by
consent cure the constitutional difficulty. When these Article III limitations are
at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the
limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to
protect.” 143
The Fifth Circuit should not have engaged in a jurisdictional analysis. Inability
to confer or consent to jurisdiction applies just to that—jurisdiction. But there
should have been no question of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1334, and it is that statute that is the subject matter jurisdiction
statute. Authority to enter judgment is something different and, whatever it is, it
should not be subject to the inability to consent issue. Unless, that is, parties
should be unable to consent to a magistrate judge—something that the circuit
attempts to address, again in a footnote, without much success. 144 Magistrates
are not implicated because of the need for consent of all parties and because the
district court may vacate the reference sua sponte. 145 But that is also precisely the
case with respect to bankruptcy. And reading Stern v. Marshall as “a narrow
holding not affecting magistrate judges” is strange, given that the opinion reads
Stern v. Marshall broadly by its own admission. 146
What about arbitration? Parties agree to an arbitration and, with very limited
exceptions, a federal court must enter judgment on the verdict and must enforce
the judgment. 147 Does this not offend the dignity of the federal courts? And why
would bankruptcy courts endanger the “institutional interests” of Article III
courts? After Northern Pipeline, circuit courts appoint, discipline, and remove
bankruptcy judges, and district courts do not have to refer matters to bankruptcy
courts. Here again the circuit appears to proclaim ipse dixit without much
analysis. If anything, the courts should focus on agency reviews, which are de
facto courts appointed by the executive and, while judicial review is available, it is
limited. With respect to bankruptcy courts, the district court can always
withdraw the reference and there are appeals.
One can understand the need to protect Article III of the Constitution and
the importance of the Article III judiciary being vigilant against the
encroachment of its power. Goals of efficiency and expediency are no license to
violate the Constitution. In an academic setting, cases like Stern v. Marshall, and
now In the Matter of BP RE, L.P. and In the Matter of Frazin, have intellectual
appeal and probably represent exactly the kind of healthy territorial
defensiveness that the Founding Fathers wanted to motivate in our three equal

141. See id. at 291.
142. See id. at 288.
143. Id. at 290 (quoting Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, LLP (In the Matters of Frazin), 732 F.3d
313, 320 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013)).
144. See id. at 288 n.11.
145. See id.
146. Compare id. at 288 n.11, with id. at 291.
147. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752–53 (2011).
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branches of government. Those practitioners that disagree with the logic of these
and similar cases, and certainly their results, perhaps arrive at their views not so
much based on cold academics, or on the need for broad Constitutional
principles that will govern for decades or centuries, but based on the knowledge
that these opinions are making it significantly harder to administer
bankruptcies. And it certainly can be of no comfort to bankruptcy judges, who
work exceptionally hard and who have huge case loads, and who probably try
the bulk of civil issues in the federal system, and who publish many opinions on
difficult civil and commercial issues that benefit all, to hear of their
Constitutional irrelevance. Or, perhaps it is precisely because bankruptcy judges
are deciding so many civil and commercial cases, and issuing so many opinions
on which many other courts, federal and state, rely, that curtailing their
authority appears necessary. But then why do Article III district courts decide so
many fewer commercial cases (or publish fewer opinions)?
This debate will not end. Everyone will continue to be frustrated by it, and
the parties who will suffer the most are litigants, who must expend substantial
and precious resources in arguing jurisdictional issues in almost every case of any
size and who, it appears, may not have quite the finality that they believed
bankruptcy brings. There is only one cure, which is to make bankruptcy judges
Article III judges, albeit of limited subject matter. This will not happen any time
soon, the same as it did not happen in 1978. 148 In light of that fact, the authors
can only encourage Article III courts, and district courts in particular, to be
more accommodating to the practical needs and realities of bankruptcy litigants,
who may find themselves having to try matters in district court far more often
than district courts are used to. 149
X. LIEN AVOIDANCE (SECTION 1146(C))
A. ACCEPTANCE LOAN CO. V. S. WHITE TRANSPORTATION, INC. (IN RE S. WHITE
TRANSPORTATION, INC.)
Section 1141(c) of the Bankruptcy Code generally provides that, “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, after
confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all
claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners
in the debtor.” 150 On the other hand, there is the long-standing rule that a
secured creditor may ignore the bankruptcy proceedings and that his lien will

148. See Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60–61 (1982).
149. One idea that can be immediately implemented is to ensure that, in multi-judge divisions,
the same district court judge hears all matters for which the reference is withdrawn from the same
bankruptcy case and related adversary proceedings. Another is to have an expedited rule for the
withdrawal of the reference because, depending on the local rules and needs of the case, this
process alone could take several months, such as by the bankruptcy court promptly recommending
the same without need for motion, response, reply, hearing, report and recommendation, more
briefing in the district court, and then potentially significant time to decide. For example, if the
parties and the bankruptcy judge certify that the matter is non-core, the reference should be
automatically withdrawn the same as it is automatically issued.
150. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2012).
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pass through bankruptcy unaffected. 151 How then do you reconcile these two
conflicting principles?
The Fifth Circuit revisited the issue in In the Matter of S. White Transportation,
Inc. 152 The secured creditor never filed a proof of claim or participated in the
Chapter 11 case. 153 However, the debtor did serve the secured creditor with the
debtor’s plan, which provided for no recovery to the secured creditor (and noted
that the debtor contested the validity of the creditor’s lien). 154 The plan was
confirmed and the debtor argued that, as a result of section 1141(c) of the Code,
the property revested free and clear of the lien and the creditor “participated” in
the bankruptcy case as a result of being served with the debtor’s plan. 155
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the debtor and held that the lien was not
avoided.156 The Court recognized the rule that four conditions must be met in
order for a lien to be avoided under section 1141(c) of the Code: “(1) the plan
must be confirmed; (2) the property that is subject to the lien must be dealt with
by the plan; (3) the lien holder must participate in the reorganization; and (4)
the plan must not preserve the lien.” 157 The issue was the third element—did the
creditor, simply by being served with the plan, “participate” in the
reorganization?
The court recognized that this requirement was a judicial gloss on the
statute. 158 Nevertheless, the Circuit noted that “that the word ‘participation’
connotes activity, and not mere nonfeasance.” 159 One method of participation
in the bankruptcy case is the filing of a claim. 160 Thus, the court concluded that
“meeting the participation requirement . . . requires more than mere passive
receipt of effective notice.” 161
This is a troubling opinion, and a potentially dangerous one. Certainly
jurisdiction and due process are critical to Chapter 11, but the Fifth Circuit did
not address the question under either principle. Indeed, the debtor actually
served the plan on the creditor. 162 What the court failed to address was finality—
a critical issue in Chapter 11. 163 The debtor and all parties, including new
lenders or new capital funders, must have finality and certainty in knowing what
the debtor’s obligations and liens postconfirmation are. The Circuit Court also
seems to have failed to apply its own precedent, to the effect that the courts
should not rewrite or add to a clear statute.164 The Circuit seems to have ignored
section 1141(a) of the Code, providing for the binding effect of a plan. And
151. See, e.g., Simmons v. Savell (In re Simmons), 765 F.2d 547, 556 (5th Cir. 1985).
152. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp. (In re S. White Transportation, Inc.), 725 F.3d
494, 495 (5th Cir. 2013).
153. See id. at 495.
154. See id. at 495–96.
155. See id. at 496.
156. See id. at 498.
157. Id. at 496.
158. See id. at 497.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 498.
162. See id. at 496–97.
163. See generally id.
164. See, e.g., King Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 946 F.2d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1998).
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what about discharge: if a creditor does not file a proof of claim but is served
with a plan, will the creditor’s claim no longer be discharged? After all, what is
the difference between lien avoidance under section 1141(c) and one of a whole
number of other things that happen upon plan confirmation and effectiveness
vis a vis a party that has not “participated” in the case, other than the
pronouncement that a secured creditor may pass his lien through bankruptcy?
And, how can that judicial pronouncement trump the explicit provisions of the
Code, provided of course that due process is complied with?
But most troubling of all is the lack of any meaningful discussion or
consideration of what constitutes “participation,” other than the simple filing of
a proof of claim, which is a circular argument (since the whole issue arises
precisely because the creditor has not filed a claim). Can the debtor file an
adversary proceeding against the creditor pre-confirmation to force
“participation?” Perhaps, but then the creditor “participates” in the adversary
proceeding. Can the debtor file a zero amount proof of claim for the creditor?
Sure, but how would that not be the same kind of passive participation by the
creditor as is the case with a plan. Can the debtor file a claim for the creditor
and object to the claim, including on the basis of an invalid lien? But what if the
lien is valid and the only basis for avoidance is section 1141(c)?
It may be that In the Matter of S. White Transportation, Inc. will not be as
important or dangerous as feared, once the practitioner is aware that service of
the plan by itself will not lead to lien avoidance for a non-participating secured
creditor (which is perhaps a wake up call to Chapter 11 practitioners, many of
whom probably believed that section 1146(c) meant exactly what it says). But it
will be up to careful and potentially creative practitioners and courts to provide
meaningful guidance and examples of what “participation” without a filed claim
means. The Fifth Circuit, unfortunately, has provided none.
As is, without some coerced “participation,” it may be that a secured creditor
can effectively veto a Chapter 11 plan that depends on the treatment of the
creditor’s lien by simply not filing a claim. And, if the current jurisdictional
discussion continues to proceed in the direction that it has, then does the
bankruptcy court even have any jurisdiction over the creditor or its lien if the
creditor does not consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction by filing a claim? The day
will come when a major secured creditor, who does not wish to be crammed
down, will simply not file a claim. Someone will try to file a claim for the
creditor, and the creditor will argue that the bankruptcy court will not have
jurisdiction, or certainly not core jurisdiction, not only over lien avoidance but
any lien modification at all, because the creditor has not subjected himself
voluntarily to such jurisdiction. In light of Stern and Fifth Circuit precedent on
non-core matters, what will the counterargument be? Or will the matter have to
proceed in district court? Section 1146(c) is the most important inducement to
bring secured creditors into the bankruptcy process, since they would certainly
much rather face the prospect of negotiations, a plan, and maybe a cramdown,
than the loss of their lien outright. But if that carrot and stick is gutted—as the
Fifth Circuit appears to have done—then why would a secured creditor
participate in Chapter 11 at all?
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XI. SALES
A. NEWCO ENERGY V. ENERGYTEC INC. (IN RE ENERGYTEC INC.)
Practitioners know, and rely upon the fact that, most bankruptcy section 363
sales are protected from reversal on appeal, which is a major benefit of
bankruptcy sales and one of the reasons why bankruptcies are filed (in order
than fair value may be obtained for an asset which was otherwise subject to
competing claims outside of bankruptcy). The Fifth Circuit addressed the appeal
mootness issue in In re Energytec Inc., in an opinion that may threaten this
bedrock policy and tool of the Code. 165
The debtor sold its pipeline during the bankruptcy case, and the bankruptcy
court reserved the issue of whether the sale was free and clear of the appellant’s
fees and interests in the pipeline (apparently because the sale could not be free
and clear of covenants running with the land). 166 The ultimate underlying issue
concerned whether the appellant’s rights were covenants running with the land,
which the bankruptcy court, approximately one year after the sale, ruled they
were not.167 The appellant did not obtain a stay pending appeal. 168 The debtor
argued that the appeal was moot under section 363(m) of the Code. 169 The
circuit eventually reversed the lower court’s conclusion on whether the
appellant’s rights were covenants running with the land, thereby raising the issue
at relief, if any, the circuit could grant with respect to the sale. 170
The circuit recounted the strong policies behind section 363(m) and the
paramount goal of finality in bankruptcy sales. 171 However, the Circuit noted
that the appellant was not challenging the sale per se, but rather only the aspect
of the sale concerning whether the sale was free and clear of the appellant’s
rights. 172 Crucially, the bankruptcy court carved this issue out of the sale order
for adjudication at a future date, and only one year later did the bankruptcy
court adjudicate the issue. 173 Apparently, the buyer decided to proceed in the
face of the potential legal and financial risks involved concerning the appellant’s
claims. 174
As held by the court, section 363(m) applies “when the challenged provision
is ‘integral to the sale’ of the debtor’s assets, which occurs ‘if the provision is so
closely linked to the agreement governing the sale that modifying or reversing
the provision would adversely alter the parties’ bargained-for exchange.’” 175
While this applies to sales, it can also apply to an aspect of a sale concerning the
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free and clear provision of section 363(f) of the Code. 176 Thus, section 363(m) of
the Code may apply to a free and clear aspect of a sale order if “the purchaser
would not have consummated the sale without assurance that it was acquiring
control of the debtor’s business, and the provisions for lien release, claims
satisfaction, and distribution were essential to acquisition of control.” 177 Here,
the buyer agreed to buy the pipeline notwithstanding the carve out from section
363(f) of the appellant’s rights. 178 Thus, the buyer demonstrated through its
actions that it would have closed the sale even without the free and clear
protection. 179 Equally as important (and hence why the opinion may be limited
to its facts) is the fact that the appellant could not have moved for a stay pending
appeal at the time of the sale order, thereby potentially avoiding section 363(m)
of the Code, because the bankruptcy court had not adjudicated its rights until
more than one year later. 180 It would be unfair and unworkable (and potentially
more prejudicial to the bankruptcy estate) for the appellant to move for a stay
pending appeal at a time when it was not known whether the buyer’s rights
would even be implicated and whether the buyer would even need to move for a
stay pending appeal.
The result, while probably technically correct, and while recognizing that
section 363(m) applies not only to the sale itself but also to any free and clear
provision integral to the sale, nevertheless limits the application of section
363(m) of the Code. Given that this is one of the most important tools that is
used to increase value to an estate, any limitation on the section should be as
narrow as possible. The problem in this case was that the buyer agreed to the
sale notwithstanding the potential that it might not be free and clear of the
appellant’s rights, and that the bankruptcy court took one year to resolve those
rights, by which time the eggs had been scrambled. Had the buyer not so agreed,
the result may well have been different. But then, there may well have been no
sale, or a sale would have been for greater consideration. That is the problem.
On the one hand, the estate needs to monetize the asset for as much as possible,
and sometimes as quickly as possible. On the other hand, the due process rights
of a claimant must be honored. Usually this is accomplished by attaching the
claim to the proceeds of the sale. This case, however, demonstrates the
difficulties that may be involved when the claimant’s right is not the type of
interest in property that can be easily sold free and clear, and which does not
therefore attach to the proceeds. Parties to such a sale must be aware of these
potential issues as soon as possible, either to procedurally and substantively
position themselves for section 363(m) protection, or to put in place alternate
protection that will still enable the sale to proceed, while protection potential in
rem claimants, such as escrow accounts.
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XII. TAXES
A. HALL V. UNITED STATES
Most practitioners assume that postpetition taxes automatically become taxes
against the estate payable as administrative claims under section 503(b) of the
Code. The Supreme Court visited the issue and the intersection of the
Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code in Hall v. United States.181
This was a Chapter 12 case. 182 During the case, the debtor sold his farm,
which triggered a capital gains tax. 183 The precise question was the treatment of
this tax under the debtor’s Chapter 12 plan, but more generally the question
was whether the tax, being incurred postpetition, was a tax “incurred by the
estate.” 184 Reviewing sections 1222, 503, and 507 of the Code, the Court noted
that the tax is a liability of the estate, as opposed to the debtor, only if
“incurred” by the estate. 185 In other words, section 503(b) does not accord
immediate administrative claim status for any postpetition taxes that may be
assessed against a debtor; just those actually incurred by the estate itself as a legal
entity. 186 In this respect, and reviewing the Internal Revenue Code, the Court
held that the estate in Chapter 12 is not a legal entity subject to being taxed. 187
Because the estate itself in Chapter 12 is not subject to being taxed under nonbankruptcy law, there is no tax “incurred” by the estate and the Code does not
change this result. 188
This is an interesting opinion, and perhaps surprising to some, given the
assumption that postpetition taxes are automatically administrative claims.
However, the opinion is likely limited to Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases.
There is one potential consequence that may be of relevance to Chapter 11.
Under the Internal Revenue Code, and as held by Hall, an estate is ordinarily
not a taxable entity. 189 The exception is Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 “in which
the debtor is an individual.” 190 It therefore seems that, if the Chapter 11 debtor
is a corporation, there may be no taxable entity and no postpetition taxes against
the estate. Of course, in order to confirm a plan, taxes against both the estate
and the debtor must be addressed, so at the Chapter 11 plan stage it may be
irrelevant whether the estate is a taxable entity or not. The more interesting
question is what happens in the event of a conversion or dismissal?
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